



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

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# National Intelligence Daily

*Saturday  
24 March 1984*

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
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**EL SALVADOR: Security for Election**

*The armed forces appear to be taking adequate security precautions for the presidential election tomorrow.*

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Army and security forces have been on full alert since Wednesday. The US defense attache reports most units in the field, including the elite battalions, have returned to their garrisons to provide security for the election. Some units will conduct local patrolling, according to the attache, but the elite units will be held ready to counter any insurgent military moves.

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There are about 40 towns where the government either has no plans to place ballot boxes or where delays have occurred.

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The insurgents claim they control over 70 towns where they will not allow balloting.

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**Comment:** The General Staff has issued warnings during the past several days about possible insurgent operations and has cited a variety of potential insurgent targets throughout the country. Several of the recently returned battalions need rest and refitting, and they would be hard pressed to respond rapidly to large-scale, widespread attacks.

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In 1982 the government placed no ballot boxes in about 30 towns located in areas of insurgent concentration.

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**BELGIUM-NETHERLANDS: Problems With INF**

*The Dutch almost certainly will not accept full INF deployment, and Belgium is having difficulty meeting its basing schedule.* [redacted]

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The Dutch representative to NATO has told the US Ambassador that a limited deployment of 16 cruise missiles now seems the most politically palatable option. The US Embassy in The Hague reports that parliamentary support for INF deployment in the Netherlands is steadily eroding. [redacted]

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Many Christian Democratic deputies are having new qualms about INF because the Calvinist Church—to which many of them belong, including Defense Minister De Ruiter—has recently rejected deployment. Although Liberals in the government coalition have reaffirmed their staunch support for deploying all 48 missiles, they will acquiesce if the other parties in the coalition decide on less than full deployment. [redacted]

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The Belgians, who recently reassured the US that they will go ahead with full deployment, are behind schedule in basing preparations. Foreign Minister Tindemans recently said the main obstacle is the government's inability to select a politically acceptable contractor to prepare the site at Florennes. [redacted]

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The US Embassy in Brussels says that the Belgians also misunderstand the timing of deployment. The schedule calls for the first missiles to arrive at Florennes next February and for all 48 missiles to be operational by the fall of 1986. The government, however, has stated publicly that the first missiles will not arrive until next March and that all missiles will not be operational until the spring of 1987. [redacted]

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**Comment:** Now that the Dutch cabinet knows the Liberals will go along with partial deployment, it may believe that it has to move quickly to avoid further erosion of parliamentary support. Consequently, the cabinet may introduce a motion in the parliament before May proposing partial INF deployment and a reduction in other Dutch nuclear roles in NATO. Parliamentary approval, however, for such a compromise is not certain. If the Dutch opt for less than full deployment, the Belgian Government will come under increasing domestic pressure to do the same. [redacted]

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**USSR-EASTERN EUROPE: Possible Visit by Chernenko**

*Soviet leader Chernenko reportedly will soon make his first visit as General Secretary to Eastern Europe, where he is viewed by some governments as representing a collective leadership rather than as the dominant Soviet political figure on policy toward their countries.*

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Romanian and Yugoslav diplomats in Prague have quoted Czechoslovak officials as saying that Chernenko will visit Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland this spring. The Czechoslovaks appear satisfied with Chernenko, and the US Embassy in Prague believes his visit there will strengthen the regime's orthodoxy and its dependence on Soviet guidance.

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Government officials elsewhere in Eastern Europe, however, have expressed skepticism about Chernenko's ability to shape Soviet policy toward their countries. The Belgian Foreign Minister says Yugoslav Foreign Minister Mojsov told him that Chernenko's talents are limited and that Foreign Minister Gromyko is the leading intellectual and political figure. The Hungarian leadership reportedly believes a collective leadership will exist in the USSR for the next several years, with Gromyko playing a decisive role.

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**Comment:** Chernenko's visit probably is intended to improve his leadership image with East European leaders, rather than to settle any of the outstanding differences between the USSR and its allies. His decision to visit the northern tier countries probably reflects their strategic importance in the Warsaw Pact. Bulgarian leaders may take offense, however, if Soviet leaders do not soon carry out the commitment to visit Sofia made by Chernenko's predecessor.

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The political importance ascribed to Gromyko by both Mojsov and the Hungarian leadership reflects their preoccupation with Soviet foreign policy. Although Gromyko may have a decisive role in this area, his influence probably does not extend to Soviet domestic policy or internal party matters. Mojsov's statements, however, do not necessarily reflect the view of the Yugoslav leadership.

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**TURKEY: Local Elections**

*The nationwide local elections tomorrow are the first major test of Turkey's new democratic system since the national election last November.* [redacted]

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The Turks will be going to the polls for the first time since the national election and for the first time at the local level since 1977. Although only the three parties approved by the military took part in the national election, six major parties are fielding candidates in the local contests. Campaigning has been intense for weeks, and Turkish authorities expect at least 80 percent of eligible voters to participate.

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Throughout the campaign, the centrist Motherland Party of Prime Minister Ozal has maintained a lead in the polls. According to one poll, however, Motherland's margin has slipped somewhat, and the left-of-center Social Democratic Party, which was not permitted to field candidates last November, has improved its position. [redacted]

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**Comment:** Motherland, which won last fall despite being the only party without military backing, probably will stay on top by winning a small plurality. The Social Democrats, buoyed by a good organization, are likely to surpass the populist party on the left and emerge with enough local power to begin extraparliamentary opposition to government policies. The new Correct Way Party, the most vigorous of the three small rightwing parties, probably will become the most effective challenger to Motherland on the right. It probably will eclipse the fast-fading Nationalist Democrats, who are supported by the military. [redacted]

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The elections will have no immediate impact on the balance of power in the government, but they almost certainly will be the first step in an eventual realignment of political parties. A nervous military will watch closely to see that the politicians remain within the bounds of the new constitution. It does not want to intervene in domestic politics again but will do so if democratic processes begin to unravel.

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**ISRAEL: Next Steps for the Election Bill**

The bill to hold general elections early, which received preliminary Knesset approval on Thursday, has gone to the constitution and law committee controlled by the ruling Likud coalition. The committee will set the date for elections next week and return the bill to the full Knesset for three mandatory votes. Prime Minister Shamir has said he will respect the decision of the Knesset and will not try to bury the bill in committee. [ ]

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**Comment:** Shamir still hopes to delay elections as long as possible and will try to reach a compromise with the Labor Party on the date. The Knesset probably will take action before it concludes its winter session on Wednesday. If deliberations in committee are prolonged, the Knesset probably will extend its session rather than allow the bill to die. [ ]

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**WESTERN EUROPE-CENTRAL AMERICA: Socialist Observers**

The secretary general of the Socialist International told a US Embassy official in London early this week that the organization will not send election observers to El Salvador. He said the leadership of the International has decided not to criticize the electoral process unless questioned by the media. The Embassy concluded that the International will send observers to the Nicaraguan election in November. The leaders of 10 West European socialist parties publicly welcomed the announcement of that election and appealed for support of the electoral process in Nicaragua. [ ]

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**Comment:** Leaders of the Socialist International are attempting to avoid conspicuous actions on El Salvador because they feel vulnerable to accusations that they are inconsistent in their treatment of El Salvador and Nicaragua. They are likely to decide to send observers to Nicaragua, even though some West European socialist parties are still suspicious of the Sandinistas. The International probably will try to delay announcing a decision on Nicaragua until publicity on the Salvadoran election has subsided. [ ]

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
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**USSR-THAILAND: Soviet Criticism**

The account by the Japanese of their recent talks in Moscow with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa has made Bangkok uneasy about the USSR's attitudes toward Thailand, according to the Thai Foreign Minister. The US Embassy reports that Kapitsa accused Bangkok of waging an undeclared war in Kampuchea and warned that Thailand would eventually "fall like a ripe fruit into another's basket."

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**Comment:** Kapitsa's threat appears intended to strengthen those elements in Thailand who are growing weary of Thai involvement in Kampuchea and who are more anti-Chinese than anti-Vietnamese. In the past, however, such threats have only strengthened Bangkok's view that its policy of trying to obstruct Vietnam's takeover of Kampuchea is correct.

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### Soviet Trainborne Defense Units



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**USSR: Trainborne Defense Units**

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[redacted]  
[redacted] These units usually consist of a tank company with T-55 tanks, a motorized rifle company with armored personnel carriers, and a reconnaissance platoon. The units have flatcars with loading ramps and armored railcars for transport. The units appear to have an authorized strength of about 300 men but currently are understrength. [redacted]

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**Comment:** These units, along with air assault units, would provide mobile forces to react more quickly to small-scale raids than would units at fixed garrisons and fortified posts that guard the strategic railroad. Their quick-reaction mission suggests the units would be brought up to strength before or at the outset of a conflict. A marked increase in their strength thus could provide early warning of potential hostilities with China. [redacted]

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**ITALY: Difficulties for Economic Legislation**

The government's decree last month that limits cost-of-living wage adjustments has met stiff opposition in parliament, especially from the Communist Party. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The nation's largest labor union, which the Communists dominate, has sponsored a series of strikes and protests that will culminate in a demonstration in Rome today. According to the US Embassy, labor leaders expect 450,000 to 650,000 participants. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** The Craxi government is entering a crucial phase in its effort to enact legislation to lower inflation and to trim the growing budget deficit. The wage issue has offered the Communists an opportunity to shore up their support and to convince the governing coalition that Italy cannot be governed without Communist acquiescence. They probably recognize, however, that widespread social unrest would not benefit anyone. Although the Communists are likely to continue their militant stand in parliament, they probably will seek a compromise on wage issues. [REDACTED]

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**USSR-INDONESIA: Foreign Minister's Visit**

*Pravda* announced yesterday that Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar would be making his long-planned trip to the USSR early next month. According to the Singapore Embassy in Moscow, the trip was temporarily in jeopardy this week when the Soviets told the Indonesians that Foreign Minister Gromyko could not be expected to see every visiting foreign minister. Mochtar canceled a trip to the USSR last year when he was told that Gromyko would be on vacation. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** Moscow's reluctance to guarantee Mochtar a meeting with Gromyko was surprising. The Soviets believe Indonesia's commitment to ASEAN's policy on Kampuchea is weak, and in recent months they appeared to be trying to exploit Jakarta's reservations to improve bilateral relations. The Indonesians see the visit primarily as an opportunity to refurbish their reputation as a nonaligned state. Their unwillingness to break with ASEAN on the Kampuchea issue and their displeasure with Moscow's handling of the trip probably rule out any major advance in Soviet-Indonesian relations. [REDACTED]

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## **Special Analysis**

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### **USSR-SYRIA-LEBANON: Moscow's Next Steps**

*The Soviets almost certainly regard the recent US setbacks in Lebanon as vindication of their policy of firm support for Syrian President Assad's strategy. Nonetheless, the "victory" of Syria—and, by association, the USSR—is clouded by the continuing presence of Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. In deference to Damascus, the Soviets are likely to remain on the sidelines in Lebanon, but they will try to parlay Syria's success there into expanded influence in the Middle East. Syria's isolation and apparent unwillingness to reconcile differences with the other Arabs, however, remain major obstacles to the USSR's effort to rebuild a credible Arab "rejectionist front" opposed to US peace efforts.*

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Since the deployment of the Multinational Force to Beirut in 1982, the USSR's primary objectives have been the removal of US forces and the prevention of a US-sponsored settlement in Lebanon. From the Soviet viewpoint, the US decision to redeploy the Marines has reduced the prospect of a permanent US military presence in Lebanon and the risk of a military confrontation with the US in the region.

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Moscow's Syrian and Lebanese friends forced President Gemayel to abrogate the troop withdrawal agreement with Israel and erased his government's control of all but the Christian heartland. Although the Soviets played no direct role in these events, the arms they supplied to Syria and to the Druze, Shia, and leftist militias via the Syrians helped make those achievements possible.

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Nonetheless, the Soviets' satisfaction with recent events in Lebanon is likely to be guarded. The unity the Syrians, Druze, and Shias have shown in opposing the government almost certainly will fragment in the course of reestablishing central authority in Lebanon.

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### **Continuing Problems**

The Soviets had always been uneasy with Syria's intervention in Lebanon. It was only after Israel's invasion in 1982 that they accepted Syria's argument that it had legitimate security interests in Lebanon. In part, this policy change was taken to ease strains in bilateral relations stemming from Syria's belief that Soviet assistance during the invasion was inadequate.

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With the redeployment of US forces and Syrian predominance growing, Soviet-Syrian differences over Lebanon are likely to reemerge. [REDACTED]

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Israel's continuing occupation of the southern third of Lebanon is a sobering factor for the Soviets, as well as for their Syrian and Lebanese friends. Syrian troops are unlikely to be withdrawn as long as the Israelis remain, thereby posing a continuing risk of a clash. Although the Israelis have stated publicly they will not intervene to save Gemayel's government, they have demonstrated they will try to prevent PLO forces from reestablishing themselves south of Beirut.

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#### **Building Influence in Lebanon**

The USSR's lack of influence in Lebanon is likely to leave it little choice but to continue deferring to Syria. The Soviets, however, probably are discreetly advising the Syrians, who need no reminding, that they should avoid provoking an Israeli countermove in Lebanon.

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An Israeli action could wipe out the gains Moscow's friends have made and lead to a new Syrian-Israeli confrontation. This would again put the USSR in the position of either coming to Syria's aid militarily or opening itself to charges of being an unreliable ally. The Soviets also probably would be worried that too bold a grab for power by Syria and its allies could prompt the US to reintroduce military personnel. [REDACTED]

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Moscow is likely to increase its contacts with the Lebanese factions, hoping to influence domestic developments. In the last two months Soviet Central Committee International Department Chief Ponomarev has consulted with Druze leader Junblatt and Lebanese Communist Party General Secretary Hawi in Moscow. Hawi also had discussions with Soviet Politburo member Aliyev in Damascus. [REDACTED]

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In addition, Soviet Ambassador Soldatov has met with Shia leaders during the past three months. [REDACTED]

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**Beyond Lebanon**

Syria's success in Lebanon strengthens the USSR's credibility among the Arabs. Even those who oppose Syrian hegemony there are likely to be impressed with the extent of Moscow's military support for Damascus over the last 18 months, in particular its deployment of SA-5 surface-to-air missile units to Syria. [REDACTED]

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Nevertheless, Syria is still the USSR's only significant ally in the Middle East. Despite its success in Lebanon, Syria remains isolated among the Arabs. [REDACTED]

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The rift in the PLO and the feud between PLO chief Arafat and President Assad make greater Arab unity—which the Soviets have long called for—as elusive as ever. Moreover, Moscow probably views such unity as may be developing in the nascent alignment of Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and Arafat's faction of the PLO as counterproductive, because it would further isolate Syria and possibly lead to increased cooperation with the US. [REDACTED]

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Over the next few months, Soviet policy probably will focus on preventing the creation of an anti-Damascus axis among the Arabs and reviving the "rejectionist front," which once included Syria, Libya, South Yemen, Algeria, Iraq, and the PLO. Moscow also is likely to continue trying to lure moderate Arab governments into this front. [REDACTED]

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The USSR's efforts to reconcile Syria with other Arabs, however, will continue to depend on Assad. At this point, the Syrian leader appears as determined as ever to chart his own course. [REDACTED]

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